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I propose an approach to naturalized philosophy o f science that takes the social 
nature o f scientific practice seriously. I criticize several prominent naturalistic 
approaches for adopting “cognitive individualism” , which limits the study of 
science to an examination of the internal psychological mechanisms of scientists.
I argue that this limits the explanatory capacity of these approaches. I then pro­
pose a three-level mode! o f the social nature o f scientific practice, and use the 
model to defend the claim that scientific knowledge is socially produced.
1. Introduction. I will argue that any attempt to naturalize the philos­
ophy of science must take into account the social nature of scientific prac­
tice. I provide an account of the social nature of scientific practice that 
gives credence to the claim that scientific knowledge is socially produced. 
Most recent approaches to naturalizing the philosophy of science have 
downplayed the social nature of scientific practice, concentrating, in­
stead, on explaining science using results from cognitive science. I will 
demonstrate that these approaches are flawed, first because they adopt 
what I call cognitive individualism, and second because scientific practice 
is irreducibly social. Cognitive individualism is the thesis that a sufficient 
explanation for all cognitive activity will be provided by an account of 
autonomous individual cognitive agents.1 Cognitive individualism is re­
lated to methodological individualism as cognitive individualists take in­
dividuals as their unit of analysis in their explanatory theories, but cog­
nitive individualism is a narrower position more akin to what philosophers 
of social science call psychologism. On this view what is cognitive is 
circumscribed by what can be described in terms of the internal psycho­
logical mechanisms of such autonomous cognitive agents. In contrast to 
this view I propose a model of the social nature of scientific knowledge 
that isolates several ways in which the term “social” can be understood, 
all of which must be included in an adequate model of scientific practice.
*Received January 1992; revised June 1992.
T h is  paper was completed during a post-doctoral fellowship at Northwestern University. 
Arthur Fine, Steve Fuller, David Hull and an anonymous referee provided helpful com­
ments on earlier drafts.
sSend reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, 338 Orson Spencer Hall, 
The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA.
'In conversation, Maurice Finocchiaro drew my attention to this point.
Philosophy o f  Science, 60 (1993) pp. 452-468
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy o f Science Association.
452
Copyright © 1993. All rights reserved.
SOCIALIZING NATURALIZED PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 453
My position draws on work in the sociology of science, but has more in 
common with “constructivist” views such as those presented in Latour 
and Woolgar (1986), Latour (1987), and Collins (1985) than the interest 
theory of the Edinburgh School most familiar to philosophers of science 
(e.g., Bloor 1976, and Barnes and Bloor 1982).
On my view all of scientific practice contributes to the production of 
scientific knowledge. Scientific practice includes carrying out experi­
ments, extending existing theories into new domains, postulating and test­
ing new theories or hypotheses, replicating experiments, peer reviewing 
of papers, and using papers published by members of a field. When I 
refer to scientific cognition I mean the activity that leads to the production 
of scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge I generally take to refer to 
the certified claims that appear in finished research papers. Scientific cog­
nition has often been taken to be a process that goes on inside the heads 
of individual scientists, and this is the view of many working now in 
naturalized philosophy of science. Defining scientific cognition as the 
activity that leads to scientific knowledge widens the scope of naturalistic 
philosophy of science, drawing attention to factors other than the psy­
chological capacities of individual scientists. Once we take account of the 
varied activities that go into the production of scientific knowledge it is 
easier to make sense of the claim that scientific knowledge is a social 
product.
My argument proceeds in several stages. First, I give a definition of 
cognitive individualism and argue that the position arises from naturalists’ 
attempts to take over the explanatory agenda of traditional philosophy of 
science. Second, I argue that cognitive-individualist attempts to explain 
hypothesis evaluation in science fail. Third, I examine some attempts by 
cognitive individualists to deal with social aspects of science. Finally, I 
develop and defend a model of the social nature of science generated from 
three distinct interpretations of the term “social”. I conclude that with 
my model we can make sense of the claim that scientific knowledge is 
socially produced.
2. Cognitive Individualism in Naturalized Philosophy of Sci­
ence. Much recent naturalized philosophy of science can be character­
ized as cognitive science of science. Cognitive scientists of science apply 
techniques from the cognitive sciences to issues previously examined by 
the philosophy of science, for example, theory change, theory evaluation, 
the nature of scientific theories, and scientific discovery. In general, 
cognitive-science-of-science researchers set their work apart from more 
traditional approaches to philosophy of science such as logical empiri­
cism. They are naturalists who hold that empirical results from current 
sciences, particularly the cognitive sciences, should inform and constrain
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philosophical theories. Some further suggest that philosophy should be 
abandoned and replaced by a particular science, so some suggest that 
cognitive science of science should replace philosophy of science (e.g., 
Giere 1988, chap. 1). Recent works by Churchland (e.g., 1990), Giere 
(e.g., 1988), Simon (e.g., Langley et al. 1987), and Thagard (e.g., 1988) 
exemplify this approach.
I argue that this approach in naturalized philosophy of science is in­
adequate. One important reason for this inadequacy is the adoption of 
what I call cognitive individualism. A cognitive-individualist account seeks 
an explanation of a cognitive phenomenon purely in terms of individuals’ 
psychological processes, understood as internal mechanisms. For exam­
ple, the choice of a particular hypothesis in a scientific field is explained 
entirely by appealing to the psychological mechanisms of an individual 
scientist in that field. In an explanation of science this approach is cru­
cially limiting because it ignores the important social dimension of sci­
entific cognitive activity.
The definition of cognitive individualism is both broad and vague at 
this point, and many explanatory approaches could be deemed cognitive 
individualist under such a definition. Later I will point out some of the 
difficulties arising specifically from the vagueness of the definition. Now 
I turn to the relation between cognitive-individualist explanations of sci­
ence and the more traditional approach in philosophy of science.
Traditional philosophy of science gives an account of scientific theories 
and their explanatory capacities. I use the expression “traditional philos­
ophy of science” to denote logical empiricist approaches such as Carnap, 
Reichenbach, and Hempel’s, as well as recent nonnaturalistic work such 
as van Fraassen’s (1980) and Glymour’s (1981). This work involves an 
examination of the logical relations between elements of a theory and 
observations supporting that theory or predicted by it. As a result of this 
rational reconstructivist approach, most traditional philosophy of science 
is neither couched in terms of individual scientists nor social groups but 
in terms of theories themselves characterized as sets of sentences, or on 
the recent semantic approach sets of models (see, e.g., van Fraassen 1980). 
This result is apparent even in more naturalistic work such as Laudan’s 
(1977, chap. 3).
Accounting for the nature of theories is also a crucial issue in natu­
ralized philosophy of science, but here the related issue of theories’ em­
bodiment becomes crucial. To date naturalists have proposed that sci­
entific theories are internal mental representations, and so philosophers 
should turn to cognitive science—whose object of inquiry is such rep­
resentations— to account for their nature. Thus the embodiment issue is 
confronted: Scientific theories are located in individual scientists’ heads. 
This approach is consistent with most research in the cognitive sciences
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where a cognitive phenomenon is accounted for in terms of an internal 
psychological mechanism. For example, mechanisms have been proposed 
that underlie deductive logic, abductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, 
pattern recognition, past tense verb learning and so on. I turn to a more 
detailed examination of current naturalistic accounts of the nature of the­
ories below.
The naturalistic turn of the cognitive scientists of science has some 
parallels with the historical orientation in the philosophy of science. Ad­
vocates of the latter argue that rational reconstructivist accounts of science 
were mistaken because these accounts did not fit with historical data. 
Historically oriented philosophers present case studies in the history of 
science that challenge various assumptions of rational reconstructivists’ 
theories. For example, if a case study demonstrates that the H-D model 
of explanation was not operative, it is argued that this provides evidence 
that the model is not generally applicable as an explanation of how sci­
ence proceeds. Compare this with the approach of a cognitive scientist 
of science who may argue that a particular philosophical theory is not 
generalizable because of what we know about human psychological makeup. 
While historically oriented philosophers claim particular historical con­
tingencies are crucial to explaining the production of scientific knowl­
edge, cognitive scientists of science propose specific psychological pro­
cesses.
Traditional philosophers of science, through their rational reconstruc­
tions, provide an abstract or idealized account of all scientific activity, 
not simply an account of the ideal individual scientist. These philosophers 
use the relevant abstractions to reconstruct the state of a field in relation 
to external events, plus the relevant community standards of the field, 
and also some norms to govern reasoning processes. Issues such as the 
nature of scientific progress and the accumulation of scientific knowledge 
are then addressed in terms of the relevant rational reconstructions of 
scientific practice. Within this framework, questions such as “Does sci­
ence converge on the truth?” are addressed.
It may seem a short step from logical empiricists’ concern with the 
reasoning that supports theories to the cognitive scientist of science’s ac­
count of individual psychological processing, but this step misses the cru­
cial idealizations and abstractions that have been carried out by traditional 
philosophers of science. The move from the abstract entities that are the­
ories on the traditional approach to the theories embodied in individuals’ 
psychological processes runs into problems. In taking up where tradi­
tional philosophers of science left off, cognitive individualists end up placing 
properties of science as a whole within individual scientists’ internal rep­
resentational structure. The former’s method of analyzing science builds 
all aspects of scientific practice into individual scientists’ heads. A nat­
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uralized philosophy of science must be able to address issues such as the 
success of science as a whole, rather than simply the relations between 
individual scientists’ internal representations and the world. I will argue 
below that a correct understanding of the social dimension of science, 
ignored by cognitive individualists, provides a naturalistic approach more 
adequate for addressing such issues.
Many philosophers argue that both social and psychological factors are 
irrelevant to the philosophical study of science (e.g., Lakatos 1981 and 
Laudan 1977, along with Reichenbach and Popper). One way of setting 
up this argument is to make a distinction between cognitive and noncog- 
nitive factors in science. The claim is that when an account of successful 
science is required it should be given in terms of cognitive factors. An 
example would be that scientific theories can be determined as approxi­
mating the truth, and such an approximation provides the metric of the 
theory’s success. A corresponding noncognitive account may explain the 
success of a theory in terms of the relation between predominant interest 
groups that prevailed in the wider society and those in the scientific com­
munity (see, e.g., Forman 1971). Philosophers defending the cognitive/ 
noncognitive distinction argue that noncognitive explanations should be 
reserved for cases of unsuccessful or failed scientific theories only, and 
that success in science can only be explained by cognitive factors (see, 
e .g ., Lakatos 1981 and Laudan 1977). This view is presented most clearly 
as Laudan’s (1977) arationality thesis: All rational scientific practice is 
to be explained by cognitive factors, and anything left over can be ex­
plained by sociologists or psychologists. Ironically, on this account the 
cognitive science of science is concerned with noncognitive factors in 
science, specifically psychological processes, as under the cognitive/non- 
cognitive distinction both psychological and sociological factors are ir­
relevant in explaining successful science.
Cognitive-science-of-science researchers further twist this story with a 
new version of the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive fac­
tors. They distinguish between cognitive processes as investigated by 
cognitive science and social processes (see, e.g., Churchland 1990, Giere 
1988, and Thagard 1988). A similar kind of explanatory hierarchy is set 
up as in the first version of the distinction. Some cognitive-science-of- 
science researchers allow that science is an activity involving many prac­
titioners, yet claim that the important cognitive output of science will be 
explained by a theory of the individual scientist’s psychological processes 
(Churchland 1990, 248; and Thagard 1989b, 80). For these researchers 
the extent to which science is social is simply that autonomous cognitive 
agents are gathered into groups. The fact that scientists are collected to­
gether in particular groups (subfields, laboratory teams, paper collabo­
rators, and so on) is not to be taken into consideration when an account
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of the cognitive output of science is desired. Nor are any properties of 
these groups, over and above the psychological capabilities of the indi­
viduals, taken into consideration. Cognitive individualism is exemplified 
in this reworking of the cognitive/noncognitive distinction. The claim is 
that a sufficient account of what is cognitive in science can be provided 
by an account of the psychological mechanisms of individual scientists.
Before turning to an examination of the social nature of science, let us 
look at a case that leads to problems for cognitive individualists. Consider 
the case of evaluating hypotheses in science. Several naturalistic philos­
ophers of science address this issue. For example, Giere (1988, chap. 6) 
proposes that “satisficing” is a psychological mechanism that enables sci­
entists to choose between rival hypotheses. Thagard (1989a) suggests that 
individual scientists have psychological mechanisms that allow them to 
evaluate hypotheses and lead them to choose the best ones. The mech­
anisms that each scientist possesses are simulated by a computer program 
called ECHO, which simulates, among other things, Darwin’s selection 
of the evolutionary hypothesis. If each scientist possesses mechanisms 
for selecting the best hypotheses, it seems reasonable to ask why it is 
that scientists work in teams, ranging in size from two- or three-member 
laboratory groups to fifty strong research teams to do just this job. Per­
haps the cognitive individualist would reply that individual scientists have 
the capacity to evaluate hypotheses by themselves, but they need not do 
all the work by themselves if others can assist; and more importantly, 
there may be time constraints on producing results, so they have to work 
in teams. Whatever the specific reason, working in teams is incidental to 
the hypothesis-evaluation process. This reply has several problems.
Consider the practical constraints on any individual attempting to do 
all the work evaluating a particular hypothesis that leads to a scientific 
discovery. First, if it is practically possible for an individual to carry out 
the tasks involved in hypothesis evaluation, then a sufficient empirical 
account of such a scientific discovery may be one that gives an account 
of the psychological processes of a somewhat idealized individual sci­
entist. There is a problem with this route. Testing, or evaluating, hy­
potheses requires more than just psychological capabilities. For example, 
the manipulative skills required either to operate specialized instruments 
or to prepare materials for examination by such instruments are an in­
tegral part of hypothesis evaluation in many sciences. Consider the tissue 
slicing and preparation that precedes the examination of samples under 
an electron microscope. Generally labor is divided according to distri­
bution of skills among the members of the scientific community.2
2Rouse (1987, chap. 4) influenced my formulation of this point. The underlying point 
is to emphasize a more thorough investigation of the rote o f experimental practice in sci­
ence as many philosophers have done recently (e .g ., Franklin 1986, Galison 1987, Good­
ing et al. 1990, and Hacking 1983).
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Second, it may simply be practically impossible for anyone to evaluate 
the hypothesis by herself. Once the tasks involved are studied in enough 
detail, it may become clear that considerations about varying individual 
cognitive competence or available memory space prevent any one indi­
vidual from carrying out the tasks. In this case the empirical status of the 
cognitive-individualist approach is threatened. Now the cognitive indi­
vidualist may avail herself of the following route: turn the claim into a 
claim that in “ideal conditions” an individual could complete the task.
The claim that in ideal conditions an individual could carry out the 
required cognitive task is not a straightforwardly empirical claim. It may 
explain the right range of phenomena, but not under the right empirical 
constraints. One can claim that something could in principle be the case, 
given certain background assumptions, but only if the background as­
sumptions are plausible. A useful analogy is introduced by Bach and Hamish 
(1982). They point out that a frictionless plane is a useful idealization in 
classical physics, but a surfaceless plane is not. I return to this issue about 
idealizations in more detail below.
Claims cast in terms of ideal conditions can be turned into normative 
claims about how a particular task might best be done, given, say, an 
infinitely capable individual processing device, but such normative talk 
does not address the empirical issue of how a particular task was carried 
out or how a particular cognitive output was produced. When developing 
a naturalized epistemology, empirical constraints must be at the forefront. 
The naturalized epistemologist faces the task of providing norms for the 
best cognitive performance given the empirical constraints on the agents 
involved. When it comes to evaluating hypotheses, scientists can deal 
with such constraints by working in teams and therefore dividing the cog­
nitive labor (see Kitcher 1990). In ignoring this fact cognitive scientists 
of science overlook the crucially social nature of the production of sci­
entific knowledge.
3. The Social Nature of Scientific Practice. In this section I develop 
three distinct senses of the term “social” that are relevant in the study of 
scientific knowledge. There are many ways of presenting the case for the 
social nature of scientific knowledge. For example, case studies can be 
presented which demonstrate that social interaction is necessary for a par­
ticular cognitive output. This has been the approach prevalent in the work 
of sociologists of science who have presented many case studies on many 
different areas of science, for example, Pickering (1984) in particle phys­
ics and Latour and Woolgar (1986) and Knorr-Cetina (1981) in biochem­
istry. Here I present a more general case for the social nature of scientific 
cognition. I first propose that scientific theories cannot be adequately 
understood without considering their social or public embodiment. Sec­
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ond, I present some thought experiments that motivate the postulation of 
two further levels of the social present in scientific practice. Finally, I 
rebut the possible objection that only current science produces social cog­
nition since the arrival of the research team approach after World War 
Two, and that previous science could be explained by a cognitive indi­
vidualist account. Overall my aim in this section is to overthrow the belief 
that the “social” is somehow extrinsic to science in the form of “social 
factors” affecting science and to show that the production of scientific 
knowledge is an intrinsically social activity.
Before presenting my own model of the social nature of science, let 
me briefly examine two recent attempts to give such an account. Recently 
Thagard (1988) and Churchland (1990) have presented accounts of the 
social nature of science against the background of the working assumption 
that the production of scientific knowledge is best explained by appealing 
to the internal psychological mechanisms of individual scientists. As such 
these accounts have at least an implicit agenda of downplaying the social 
nature of scientific practice. Their attempt to marginalize so-called social 
factors demonstrates an inadequate understanding of the best way to ana­
lyze the term “social” with respect to scientific practice. (Of course sev­
eral philosophers have attempted to develop positive accounts of the so­
cial nature of scientific practice. My approach shares features with Rouse’s 
1987 and Fuller’s 1989. Several other philosophers have developed ac­
counts of science that emphasize a positive role for social processes in 
producing knowledge, for example, Hull 1988b and Longino 1990.)
Thagard (1988, 186) describes the social nature of science with a model 
of various autonomous individual scientists sending their theories or hy­
potheses to a central reviewer. The reviewer in Thagard’s model has the 
functional role of the peer-review system in science, but the model is 
highly schematic. Science is social, on Thagard’s view, as a result of the 
fact that a group of psychologically internally equivalent scientists feed 
their findings to the reviewer. This account has no room for variations 
in the types of interactions between the scientists and the reviewer, nor 
does it have room to account for many of the other social interactions 
that go on in science. Thagard (ibid., 189) does advance the claim that 
we could develop computer models in which the scientists modeled were 
not internally equivalent but behaved instead like idealized Kuhnians or 
Popperians, but this is hardly an attempt to model what is actually going 
on in scientific practice.
Churchland (1990, 248) reintroduces Laudan’s arationality thesis by 
claiming that social factors “corrupt” science. Churchland claims that we 
can distinguish between the social determination of conceptual change 
and the influence of the “world itself” on conceptual change, arguing that 
the latter can be investigated independently. He claims that if social fac­
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tors determine conceptual change we have no recourse but to global skep­
ticism. What Churchland does not establish is how one distinguishes be­
tween the effect of so-called social factors and the “world itself” on an 
individual cognitive system.
Thagard’s account downplays the role social interaction plays in sci­
ence but at least acknowledges that it plays some role in the production 
of scientific knowledge. Churchland assumes that we can distinguish clearly 
between the influence of the world and the influence of society on con­
ceptual change. Without a model of just exactly what the term “social” 
refers to, this distinction is very hard to fathom. Developing such a model 
is the task I turn to now.
One motivation for turning to a social rather than a cognitive-individualist 
approach in philosophy of science comes from considering the complex­
ities arising from attempts to explain scientific theories. Churchland (1990), 
for example, claims that theories are embodied in an individual’s neural 
makeup. Such a view can be challenged by presenting the many features 
of scientific theories that are not captured by treating them as individuals’ 
representational structures. Theories can be embodied in textbooks; they 
can be crucially linked to instrumentation; students can use certain parts 
of a theory without ever learning other parts; theories can be general world 
views such as “evolutionary theory”, which change their content over 
time (consider the differences in evolutionary theory between 1890 and 
1990; see Laudan 1977) and so on.
Cognitive scientists of science propose several different accounts of the 
nature of theories. Thagard (1988) claims they are schemata, Giere (1988) 
proposes that they are mental models, and Churchland (1990) that they 
are points in the weight space of a parallel distributed processing network 
(or partitions in weight space). These accounts all hold that the notion of 
a theory is captured adequately by a representational structure within an 
individual’s head. None of the accounts captures each particular theory’s 
constantly changing nature across time, or what it is about the theory that 
remains permanent across time, or the fact that scientists using the same 
theory need not have exactly the same version of that theory available to 
them. Examples of this latter phenomena are Dirac’s independent deri­
vation of some of the quantum results, and Wallace’s independently de­
veloped version of evolutionary theory. An account of individual scien­
tists’ representational structures does not do justice to these features of 
scientific theories if the aim of delineating the representational structure 
is to capture the whole theory. There are cases in the history of science 
where it looks as if a scientist conceived of and applied a whole scientific 
theory by himself, for example, Einstein’s development of special rela­
tivity. But even here, an account merely in terms of the theory as an
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internal representation is inadequate. (I expand this point below in a re­
sponse to the Robinson Crusoe objection.)
Cognitive-science-of-science researchers’ accounts of the nature of sci­
entific theories may be a legacy from traditional philosophy of science. 
Philosophers of science have traditionally been concerned with the post 
facto  reconstruction of theories, which traditionally required no conces­
sions to their historical development. So two competing theories are for­
mulated in their entirety and then assessed by their ability to cope with 
the relevant observations. Cognitive scientists of science explicitly strive 
to overcome this “static” view of theories (see, e .g ., Giere 1988, chap. 
3). But in their new accounts of theory evaluation, the static picture is 
recreated in terms of internal mental representations. For example, Thagard 
(1989a) reconstructs Darwin’s psychological process of comparing evo­
lutionary theory with creationism. A computer program, ECHO, com­
pares the ability of hypotheses from both creationism and evolutionary 
theory to cope with appropriate data. Giere (1988, chap. 8) reconstructs 
the process of comparing continental drift theory with its predecessor. He 
suggests that individual scientists use a form of decision matrix to choose 
between rival theories construed as models. Both accounts present pic­
tures of an individual researcher who internalizes two theories, say Tl 
and T2, and uses a stock of psychological mechanisms to decide which 
theory is superior.
I believe that a theory can persist through generations of research (de­
spite its gradually changing nature) because of its embodiment in text­
books, research papers, instruments, computer memories and so on, all 
of which are the shared property of the scientific community (see Hacking 
1983). On this view the problems of how one transfers one whole theory 
from the head of one researcher to the next dissolve. One can also attri­
bute beliefs about a theory’s truth to scientists without having to assume 
that they have in their heads a representation of that entire theory which 
they have independently assessed as best describing the world. If science 
is conceived as a communal project involving the communication of 
knowledge and the accumulation of knowledge for use by other contem­
porary scientists, as well as future generations of scientists, it becomes 
obvious that theories need some form of embodiment in addition to in­
ternal representational structures of individual scientists. This conception 
of scientific knowledge communication and accumulation is similar to 
Campbell’s (1969) “fish scale model of omniscience” .
Cognitive-science-of-science accounts of scientific theories share the 
implicit claim that one account will suffice for all scientific theories. This 
claim is overly ambitious. The many ways that any one theory is mani­
fest, at the same time or over periods of time, indicate that a universal 
account of “the nature of scientific theories” will be illusory (see Downes
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1992). We may have to be satisfied with several different accounts of 
theories, each having its own appropriate ranges of application, as well 
as a variety of objects that count as theories. One advantage of my ap­
proach is that this possibility is not ruled out.
I now address a possible objection to my alternative account of the 
nature of scientific theories. This objection is made from the point of view 
of someone capitalizing on the vagueness in my definition of cognitive 
individualism.3 Imagine someone named Robin Crusoe is shipwrecked 
and stranded on an island. She is a reasonably mature adult and prior to 
her sea voyage she had some training in science, physics and some bot­
any. To while away the hours during the day time, she carries out some 
rudimentary experiments on plants, and at night she attempts to plot out 
the planet’s paths. We should be willing to say that she is doing science, 
at least on any reasonable definition of science. The objection to my ac­
count refers to this scenario, and runs thus: Surely on the definition of 
cognitive individualism given above, we can give a cognitive-individualist 
explanation of Robin Crusoe’s scientific practice. She only has access to 
the theories she has remembered and hence brought with her as mental 
representations, and so in this case we do not need any more of an account 
of scientific theories than one that treats them as her mental representa­
tions.
My reply involves introducing another related scenario. Robinson Crusoe 
is stranded on an island after a shipwreck, but he is only ten years old. 
He is determined that he will survive until rescued, and so over time he 
tests various plants and beasts to see how they taste and eats the ones he 
can tolerate. At night he gazes at the stars and over time begins to realize 
that some of them move relative to the rest. Now in this case we may 
be reluctant on any account to call any of Robinson’s activities science. 
My challenge to the cognitive individualist is to explain, entirely in terms 
of internal mental representations, the crucial differences between the two 
scenarios that lead us to consider Robin to be practicing science and Rob­
inson not.
The crucial differences between the two activities are in the relation 
that Robin’s activity bears to a shared body of knowledge in which she 
was able to partake. She knows that various planets cannot be seen with­
out a telescope and that they have elliptical orbits. She also knows how­
to identify several species of plants, the ones that are particularly wide­
spread for example, and can spot resemblances between unfamiliar ones 
and familiar ones. The theoretical knowledge she has is not in virtue of 
her mental representations alone but in virtue of their relation to a com-
3William E. Morris presented this objection, and discussion with him led to the for­
mulation o f  my reply.
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mon stock of knowledge. Where she got these representations and what 
they relate to is important. What distinguishes Robin’s from Robinson’s 
activity cannot be made explicit without moving outside the cognitive- 
individualist account and referring to the communal nature of scientific 
theories and alternative embodiments for them. Thus the cognitive- 
individualist approach is insufficient to account for the role of scientific 
theories in scientific practice.
The public embodiment of scientific theories is one of the social aspects 
of scientific practice, which I will call level 1 .1 now introduce two further 
distinct social levels in scientific practice and provide some conceptual 
arguments supporting the claim that scientific cognition is a social prod­
uct.
Consider the following kind of interaction: If a particular output could 
be produced by a group of people, and yet it could not be analyzed in 
terms of the contributions of the individuals in a group (say by adding 
each of their contributions together), we could say that the relevant prod­
uct was a social product. The following example captures this notion of 
social interaction, which I will call level 2. Marching bands often perform 
routines that leave their members distributed in such a way on the football 
field as to write the name of their team. The “output” of the band, the 
name of the team read by the fans in the stands, is not something that 
can be analyzed in terms of the “outputs” of individual band members. 
Imagine a case in which the band wrote an obscene word on the field. 
We could interpret this only as a case o f group defiance, or mischief. 
Perhaps extreme coercion on behalf of a small subgroup might produce 
the word, but the relevant output still cannot be analyzed in terms of the 
contributions of individual band members.
To sharpen this example imagine what idealization, or idealizations, 
would enable an individual band member to produce the desired effect. 
The point of this extension of the thought experiment is to highlight the 
difficulty of appealing to idealizations. Arguments claiming that in ideal 
conditions an individual could produce a certain effect generally do not 
hold for cases of social interaction that conform to this model. How would 
an individual band member go about producing the desired output? The 
kind of ideal band member we would have to conjure up would certainly 
have to defy many physical laws, such as being in many places at one 
time. In cases like this Bach and Hamish’s (1982) analogy is telling. 
Recall that they argued that certain idealizations were informative and 
useful in explanations, such as frictionless planes, but others, such as 
surfaceless planes, were not. If an idealization invokes inconceivable no­
tions, such as a surfaceless plane or an individual who can be in hundreds 
of places at the same time, it is not useful. In this kind of case it is more 
productive to seek an explanation that does not rely on such idealizations,
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specifically an explanation that acknowledged that social interaction is a 
crucial explanatory factor.
A more general naturalistic position underlies this specific point. Phi­
losophers who invoke brains in vats or science fiction provide empirically 
impossible explanations for phenomena. Similarly, some attempt to ac­
count for counterexamples to a theory with progressive idealizations of 
the original explanatory theory. Naturalistic philosophers should be sat­
isfied with having their theories account for empirical facts, and ideal­
izing their theoretical entities within the bounds of what is empirically 
plausible. Wilkes (1988) and David Hull (1988a) make a related point to 
this one.
In cases that conform to the marching band example, I propose that 
the output results from particular kinds of social interaction. In science 
this kind of interaction occurs in complex laboratory work where no one 
researcher is entirely responsible for the ultimate cognitive output. This 
kind of social interaction in science is discussed in some detail by Rouse 
(1987, 109), who uses Fleck’s (1979) account of the discovery of the 
Wassermann reaction to focus the point.4 The relevant cognitive output 
in such cases is a validated hypothesis or, in more concrete terms, a re­
search paper. This is level 2 in my three-level model.
Let us now turn to the third level. Consider the question “Are there 
any lone scientists?” The following thought experiments are based on this 
question. Imagine two women identically dressed doing identical tasks in 
identical rooms. They are performing operations with various test tubes 
full of liquid; they pour the liquid into a machine, then write down figures 
displayed on a screen at the side of the machine. One woman is involved 
in an important scientific experiment and the other is rehearsing a role in 
a play, which depicts a post-nuclear-holocaust society, who performs the 
actions of experimental scientists as a religious ritual that invokes a pre­
holocaust past. Neither woman defines her own context by her activities. 
Each woman’s involvement in a greater picture, the first in the biochem­
istry community and the second in the theater group, provides the context 
for these activities.5
‘'There is a similarity between the social interaction that leads to scientific cognition and 
the social interaction that Putnam (1975, 271) claimed contributed to meaning. Putnam’s 
notion o f  the “division o f  linguistic labor” (ibid.) influenced my thinking on the division 
o f cognitive labor in science.
5 A related point can be made by imagining how one could stop the women from being 
scientists. A s w e can establish that they are scientists only from their context, w e can 
prevent them from being scientists only by manipulating their context. These types o f  
considerations cause problems not only for cognitive individualists, but also for naive lab­
oratory anthropologists/ethnographers who have no theoretical considerations to fall back 
on concerning larger issues in science such as validation of discoveries and the honorific 
nature o f  facts. Latour and W oolgar (1986) and Latour (1987) do not fall into this category 
as they devote a large amount o f  space to the validation o f scientific claims once they 
leave the laboratory.
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Consider another scenario in which two identical computer programs 
are running on identical machines connected to two larger identical ma­
chines in two identical rooms; both produce a printout of numbers and 
sentence fragments in English. One set of computer printouts is used by 
an artist to form a continuous frieze down the entire spiral length of the 
Guggenheim Museum, and the other is taken by a group of scientists who 
interpret its numbers and sentence fragments and submit them in the form 
of a paper to Science, claiming that the computer has made a discovery. 
One cannot distinguish between the activities of the two computers simply 
by appealing to facts about their output and their physical makeup. The 
second computer is interpreted as doing science because it has a certain 
place within the scientific community.
A final example further illustrates the level 3 sense of the social. At a 
coronation the crowning of a queen and her role makes sense only against 
the background of the beliefs of the nation in which she is crowned.
These thought experiments introduce a level of the social that helps 
focus both the scale of investigations of science and its inescapably social 
nature. The wider context is crucial in making sense of an activity as a 
contribution to science. In each of the first two examples above, facts 
about the wider context of the specific activities provide answers to most 
of our questions about the significance of each of the two identical types 
of activity and enable us to distinguish them from one another. The co­
ronation example invokes a notion of social interaction that is shared with 
the thought experiments. Scientific discoveries are analogous to the co­
ronation case. Often the acceptance of a discovery and its place within a 
body of communally shared knowledge distinguishes it from similar ep­
isodes that are not accepted as scientific discoveries (see Brannigan 1981).
With level 3 I attempt to capture what some consider to be the boundary 
between society in general and the society of scientists. I agree with crit­
ics of Mertonian sociology of science and later critics of Edinburgh School 
sociology of science who have pointed out that this boundary is not dis­
tinct (see, e .g ., Mulkay 1976, Woolgar 1988, and Latour 1987). The fact 
that scientific work has a point is relative not only to a particular com­
munity of scientists but to society as a whole. This claim that level 3 
plays an important part in the production of scientific knowledge does 
not reduce to the more familiar claim that wider societal interests deter­
mine the content of scientific theory (see Forman 1971, Bloor 1976, and 
Barnes and Bloor 1982).
By distinguishing the three levels I aim to show that the term “social” 
does not simply denote “that which is outside science” . My aim in in­
troducing the thought experiments is suggestive rather than an attempt to 
demonstrate the necessity of the three social levels. I have attempted to 
use the thought experiments to draw out three senses of the term “social”
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that are run together in many of the sociological and historical case stud­
ies. My claim is that all three levels of the social are intrinsic to scientific 
practice and, hence, contribute to the production of all scientific knowl­
edge.
Let us consider the objection that we are tempted to a social account 
merely because science has recently become such a large-scale affair. Of 
course, the objection runs, science is prima facie a social activity in the 
present day because of the advent of large research teams. What is ob­
jectionable is the claim that scientific knowledge in general is a social 
product. For example, would not the work of a seventeenth-century sci­
entist such as Boyle be better accounted for by cognitive individualists?
Shapin and Schaffer (1985) show that Boyle required technicians to set 
up and operate his famous airpump experiments. This alone does not sup­
port the claim that scientific knowledge in Boyle’s time was socially pro­
duced. Shapin and Schaffer’s crucial point is that these technicians were 
not able to report the results of experiments. Experimental results were 
established by the invitation of a selection of appropriate witnesses, mem­
bers of Boyle’s own social peer group, to observe the experiments. This 
procedure was required to corroborate the experimental results. Shapin 
and Schaffer’s add that Hobbes believed that there could be no science 
in the state of nature, as without a properly ordered society there could 
be no communication.
In my model, witnesses are necessary in the production of the results, 
level 2, and are also necessary in certifying these results in the wider 
society, level 3. The role as nobles and gentlemen is bestowed upon the 
witnesses by society, and so they are suitably qualified to present these 
results to that society. The claim is not simply that science is usually 
practiced by groups of people who, given the right conditions, may be 
dispensable but, rather, that scientific knowledge, the final validated out­
come of scientific practice, is a result of certain crucial social interac­
tions.
4. Conclusion. I have highlighted several aspects of the social nature of 
science. First, I pointed to the public embodiment of theories, which was 
necessary for their transmission across communities and across time; I 
call this level 1. Notice that part of this aspect of the social nature of 
scientific theories need not refer to people themselves, as theories are in 
part the books, instruments, and computer programs in which they are 
embodied. The notion of social at work here relies on the idea that such 
embodied theories are public or communal property (see Latour and 
Woolgar 1986, Latour 1987, Woolgar 1988, Rouse 1987, Ackermann 
1985, Hacking 1983). Second, I used a thought experiment to illustrate 
how social interaction can lead directly to cognitive products; this is level
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2. Third, I developed some thought experiments to motivate the idea that 
the wider society is crucial for the validation of scientific discoveries, 
providing a point to the scientific enterprise, and making sense of the 
relationship between the scientific community and society at large. This 
latter is level 3. Finally, I used the three-level model of the social to 
demonstrate that seventeenth-century science provides us with an ex­
ample of the social production of scientific knowledge, thus blocking the 
objection that science is only prima facie social in its current big-science 
guise. Once the notion of social is analyzed in this way it is easier to 
understand claims that scientific knowledge is socially produced. All sci­
entific practice involves at least the three levels of the social I have iso­
lated.
Two sets of implications can be drawn from my arguments. The first 
set is descriptive and addresses the descriptive adequacy of the cognitive- 
science-of-science type of approach in naturalized philosophy of science. 
The main thrust here is that we should not be content with any descriptive 
account of science that is couched purely in terms of individual scientists’ 
putative psychological processes. The second set is normative and con­
nects with the difficult problem of providing any naturalistic yet nor­
mative account. The issue here is centered around the maxim “ought im­
plies can” and is that if we attempt to derive norms for particular activities 
from descriptive accounts, the norms must appropriately apply to those 
activities as they actually occur. My general conclusions are that cogni­
tive science of science cannot provide adequate descriptive accounts of 
science if it retains cognitive individualism, and second, that a naturalistic 
philosophy of science with a normative dimension must have a descriptive 
basis that takes into account the distinctive social nature of scientific prac­
tice.
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